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ABSTRACT
Theexperience of U.S. monetary policy during 1979—82 provided
useful and potentially important new evidence about how monetary
policy affects economic activity. This paper considers, inthe light
of that evidence, six familiar propositions supporting the use of
monetary aggregate targets for monetary policy. These propositions
deal with money and nominal income, with price inflation and real economic
growth, and with long—term interest rates. The evidence fromthe
1979-82 experiment leads to doubt rather than confidence in each of these









LESSONS FROM THE 1979-1982 MONETARY POLICY EXPERIMENT
Benjamin M. Friedman*
Macroeconomics is not a laboratory science. Economists must learn about
macroeconomic behavior from the events that occur in the real world, rather than
from controlled experiments which they can design and implement themselves.
Especially when they represent potentially substantial breaks from prior
experience —inother words, when they greatly increase the range and variance
of the available data —suchreal—world "experiments' can provide important
information about how economies, and the households and firmsthatcomprise them,
behave. The quadrupling of oil prices in the early l97Os was one example, and
economists have been quick to learn from it. The experience of tJ.S. monetary
policy at the outset of the 1980s has now provided another such opportunity.
The latest monetary policy experiment in the United States lasted almost
precisely three years. On October 6, 1979, the Federal Reserve System announced
a new policy orientation in which it would henceforth place renewed emphasis on
growth targets for the major monetary aggregates, and also implement new operating
procedures to help achieve those targets, The principal motivation for these
changes was an economic situation marked by rising price inflation, already at
or near record post—war levels, and a deteriorating international value of the
dollar. On October 9, 1982, the Federal Reserve chairman announced a tttemporaryll
abandonment of the stated growth target for the narrow Ml money stock, up to
then by far the most important monetary aggregate for policy purposes. The economic
situation motivating this reversal was a deepening business recession, with
unemployment at record levels, despite money growth in excess of targeted ranges.
The object of this paper is to survey the lessons to be drawn from this
three—year monetary policy experiment. The focus is on lessons associated with—2—
theoverall use of monetary aggregate targets, rather than the specific
operating procedures used to achieve them. The plan of the paperis to consider
a series of familiar propositions often (but certainly not universally)
associated with the use of monetary aggregate targets for monetary policy, in
light of various forms of evidence from these three years ranging as seems
appropriate (given space limitations) from simple inspectionof data series to
more elaborate statistical procedures. To anticipate, theevidence from the
1979—82 experiment leads to doubt, rather than confidence, in each of these
propositions.
I. Money and Nominal Income
To begin, targeting monetary aggregates requires deciding what monetary
aggregates to target. In the short run —say,a year or so —shiftsin the
portfolio preferences of the nonbank public may change the relationships defining
mutually consistent growth rates for different deposit-type aggregates.Over
longer tine horizons, however, like those relevant for "gradualist" proposalsto
slow money growth bye. say, 1% per annum until price inflation is eliminated,it
wouldbeconvenient for policy purposes to believe
Proposition41:The major monetary aggregates move roughly together over
substantial spans of time, so that the central bank can
simply pick one aggregate and target it appropriately
without having to worry about mixed signals.
Table 1 shows the annual growth rates (fourth quarter over previous fourth
quarter, as the Federal Peserve formulates its targets) forthe three major
monetary aggregates during 1978-1982. Even over a half-decade,the basic directions
indicated respectively by Ml, M2 and M3 disagreed. Given the inherited historyof
1978, the Federal Peserve under the new policy did approximatelyachieve a 1% per
annum slowing in Ml growth over 1979, 1980 and 1981. By contrast,M2 growth
became consistently faster during these years, while M3 growth fluctuatedwithoutTABLE 1
Growthof Money aridNominalIncome, 1978-1982
Nominal
Ml M2 M3 Income
1978 8.1% 8.0% 11.2% 14.7%
1979 7.4 8.1 9.6 9.7
1980 7.2 9.0 9.7 9.3
1981 5.1 9.4 11.7 10.8
1982 8.5 9.3 10.1 2.6—3—
discernabletrend. Even in 1982, the year in which the experiment ended, the
widely discussed easing of monetary policy is apparent in a quickening of Ml growth
but not M2 growth, while M3 growth slowed sharply.
The point here is not to determine whether these dissimilar growth rates
are explainable in terms of accepted portfolio—theoretic behavior in conjunction
with the financial innovations and regulatory changes affecting the U.S. banking
system during these years. It is instead that, even over a five—year period,the
answer to so basic a question as whether money growth is speeding up or slowing
down depends on which among the major monetary aggregates is doing the answering.
The implication for monetary policy is that "monetary aggregates" —thatis,
the major aggregates collectively —areof limited usefulness as a central focus
for policy. To use monetary aggregates in this way, the central bank must have
a clear view of which specific aggregates it is using, and why.
At a more basic level, placing monetary aggregates at the center of the
monetary policy process depends not just on their relationships amongthemselves
but on their connection to nonfinancial economic activity. Pn important line of
thinking has argued that it is appropriate to think about this connection, at
least at the outset, in terms of a relationship between money and nominal income.
Once again, for most policy purposes it is not important —or,given feasible
monetary control, even very relevant —to have a tight relationship overshort
time periods. Nevertheless, for time horizons like those involved in the recent
experiment, it is difficult to motivate the use of monetary aggregate targets
for monetary policy without claiming
Proposition #2: The movement of at least some monetary aggregate roughly explains
themovement of nominal income over substantial time spans.
Table 1 also shows the annual growth (again, fourth quarter over previous
fourth quarter) of nominal gross national product. Even after making allowance
forplausible time lags, it is difficult to examine the data in Table1 as a—4—
whole and conclude that the movement of any one monetary aggregate has even
roughly accounted for the movement of nominal income over these years. The best
candidate for explaining the 5% fall in income growth in 1979 is M2 growth,
which declined from 11.2% in 1977 (not shown) to 8.0% in 1978.1 By contrast,
Ni growth is the only one of the three to have declined in 1981, and even that
decline is small in comparison with the more than 8% fall in income growth in
1982.
In sum, the movement of nominal income during these years has been
difficult to reconcile with the respective movements in the major monetary
aggregates, at least without going well beyond the usual arguments for monetary
aggregate targets based on the presumption of a stable (and, usually, a
relatively interest insensitive) money—income relationship.
II. Price Inflation and Real Economic Growth
Presumably policy makers care not just about nominal income growth but
also about price inflation and real growth separately. One of the most
interesting developments in macroeconomics within the past decade has been a line
of reasoning implying that, because of effects due to expectations, the use of
pre—announced monetary aggregate targets may favorably affect the respective
impacts of monetary policy on inflation and real economic activity. In the
context of a disinflation through monetary policy like that begun in the United
States in 1979, the idea is that a slowing of monetary growth that is widely
publicized in advance, as in October 1979and thereafter,would affect the
expectationson which households and firms act, and thereby cause a given slowing
of nominal income: growth to consist of more rapid slowing of inflation, and less
slowingof real activity, than would otherwise be the case.
If valid, this role of monetary aggregate targets would be valuable indeed.—5—
Just as the idea of the stable Phillips curve held out the prospect of
solving the chief macroeconomic policy problem of the 1950s and 1960s,
unemployment, without the cost of accelerating inflation, the "newclassical
macroeconomics" has more recently offered the prospect of solving the chief
macroeconomic problem of the l970s, inflation, without the conventionally
associated costs of foregone output, employment and income.
Thisview of the potential contribution of pre—announced monetary
aggregate targets involves several elements on whichthe 1979—82 experiment
in U.S. monetary policy can shed light. One, following familiar criticisms
of the standard Phillips curve literature, is
Proposition #3: A pre—announced slowing of money growthwill lead to a more
rapid slowing of price inflation than would be consistent
with prior historicalcorrelations.
Theactual path of U.S. price inflation since October 1979, in comparison
to forecasts from equations based on prior data, shows just the opposite. The
small "structural" inacroeconometric model estimated using quarterly 1961:1—
1979:3data in Clarida and Friedman (1983) includes a simplelinear function
relating price inflation to lagged values of real growth, changes inthe terms
of trade, andinflation itself.2 Although the relevant F-test for the null
hypothesisof stable coefficients provides marginally significant evidence of
a break with the onset of the new monetary policy regime in 1979:4,the
equation'sdynamic forecast for 1979 :4-1983:2 indicates that this break has
beenin the oppositedirection to that implied by the new classical macroeconomics.
The equation underpredicts inflation in fourteen of the fifteen forecast
quarters, with an overall average predicted inflation rate of only5.0% per
annumversusthe actual 7.0%, The slowing of price inflation since October
1979hasbeen not more rapid but more sluggish than would have been consistent
with the correlations exhibited by prior experience, given the subsequent two—6—
business recessions and the sharp appreciation of the exchange rate. In
other words, what has been surprising about inflation during this period was
how sluggishly, not how rapidly, it slowed. Similar price equations —see,
for example, Perry (1983) —showsimilar results.
Moreover, this result is not simply due to an arbitrarily specified set
of "structural" restrictions on the data. The vector autoregression model
estimated using data through 1979:3 in Clarida and Friedman (1984) includes the
inflation rate, the respective growth rates of real income, money (Ml) and total
credit, and the changes in the Treasury bill rate and the federal deficit. The
dynamic forecast generated by this completely non—structural way of summarizing
the correlations in the pre-1979 :4 data overpredicts inflation (8.4% per annum)
on average during 1979:4-1983:2, but the forecasting exercise which most closely
corresponds to the proposition relating the slowing of inflation to the use of
pre—announced monetary targets does the opposite. In particular, using a
technique due to Doan et al. (1983) to forecast inflation during each quarter
of 1979 :4-1983:2 on the basis of the historical correlations as summarized by
the model as well as the actual values of money growth in all quarters of this
period raises the nan forecast by an absurd amount(to24%) in comparison to
eitherthe actual experience or the unconditional forecast.3
The other side of the coin of favoring the use of pre-announced monetary
aggregatetargets because the associated expectations effects may make
disinflation more rapid is that they may makeitless costly. Conventional
estimates, like those summarized by Okun (1978), have indicated that the cost of
each one percentage point reduction in the ongoing rate of price inflation
achieved via monetary policy is between two and six "point—years" of unemployment,
with a median estimate of three point-years (or, equivalently, 6—18% of a year's
total output, with a medianof9%). Such pessimistic estimates have often—7-.
discouraged advocates of disinflationary monetary policy. Byconstrast, the
same reasoning associating a pre-announced slowingof money growth with
unexpectedly rapid disinflation suggests
Proposition #4: A pre—announced slowing of money growthwill cause a given
slowing of price inflation to be accompanied by less foregone
output, employment and income than would be consistentwith
prior historical correlations.
Table 2 shows the annual rates of change of real gross national product
and the associated price deflator, and the annual average unemploymentrate
during 1978—83. The final column of the table also shows,for 1980-83, the
cumulative excess of the unemployment rate above 6% (the approximate average
for the twoprioryears). The slowing of inflation from nearly 10% in1980-81
to 5% in 1982 has, just during 1980—83, required some 10 point-yearsof excess
unemployment —aboutat the 2-to-l lower end of the range surveyed by Okun.
Stopping the accounts at 1983 makes no sense, however.Even the optimistic
view that the U.S. economy will return to full employment fairly quickly,with
no reversal at all in the disinflation already achieved, putsthe likely final
tally closer to Okun's 3—to—l median. If the currenteconomic recovery falters,
or if inflation speeds up, the final tally could easilybe nearer the 6—to-l
upper end.
Whether this ratio ultimately turns out to be somewhatabove or somewhat
below Okun's median is beside the point. What matters isthat the real costs
of disinflation achieved by monetary policy have been aboutin line with earlier
conventional estimates, notwithstanding the use of monetary aggregate targets.
iii. Monetary Policy and Long-Term Interest Rates
Price inflation and real growth are not the oiilydimensions of economic
activity for which the impact of monetary policy dependsimportantly on
expectations. Perhaps the most familiar aspect ofthis subject is the behaviorTABLE 2
Inflation,Growth and Unemployment, 1978-1983
Cumulative
Price Peal Unemployment Excess
Inflation Growth Rate Unemployment
1978 7.4% 5.0% 6.1% —
1979 8.6 2.8 5.8 —
1980 9.3 —0.4 7.1 1.1%
1981 9.4 2.6 7.6 2.7
1982 6.0 —1.9 9.7 6.4
1983 50a 34a 10.1
aFirstthree quarters at annual rate.
bit eleven months.—8—
of the yields on (prices of) assets which represent explicit future claims, and
which therefore explicitly involve expectations about future events. A
standard distinction in this context is that between the respective effects of
monetary policy on short- and long-term interest rates. While a tightening of
monetary policy might well lead to higher short—term rates (unless the new
classical macroeconomics arguments discussed above are valid), it need not lead
to higher long—term rates if those rates embody expectations of lower price
inflation (and hence lower short-term rates) in the future. More specifically,
Proposition #5: A pre—announced slowing of money growth will lead to lower
long—term interest rates than would ordinarily be consistent
with the prevailing levels of short-term rates, given prior
historical correlations.
The actual path of U.S. long-term interest rates since October 1979, in
comparison to forecasts from equations based on prior data, shows the opposite.
The "structural" model estimated using 1961 :1-1979:3 data in Clarida and
Friedman (1983) includes a simple linear function relating the bond rate to
current and lagged values of the Treasury bill rate, lagged changes in the
maturity composition of outstanding federal government debt, and the lagged
bond rate.4 As with the model's price equation, there is significant evidence
of a break after 1979:3, but here too the observed shift has been in the opposite
direction to that implied by the proposition about the use of monetary aggregate
targets. The equation underpredicts the bond rate in every quarter during
1979:4-1983:2, with an overall average predicted rate of only 10.91% versus the
actual 14.81%. Given short—term rates, long—term rates have been surprisingly
high, not surprisingly low. Other term structure equations —see,for example,
Shiller et al. (1983) —showsimilar results.
Finally, ever since the Federal Reserve began to focus such attention on
its monetary aggregate targets, a familiar argument has been that market—9—
participants'expectations have rendered it a "prisoner" to its own announcements.
The basic reasoning involved has been just the inverse of that examined above,
againdenying the ability of monetary policy to affect long-term interest
rates except by affecting expectations of future price inflation. 2ny easing
of monetary policy involving money growth significantly in excess of the
targeted range would lead long—term interest rates to rise rather than fall.
In the extreme case, the expectation associated with the abandonment of such
targets is
Proposition #6: abandonment of monetary aggregate targets for monetary policy,
especially in conjunction with money growth in excess of
previously targeted ranges, will cause long—term interest
rates to rise.
The movement of U.S. long—term interest rates that accompanied the end
of 1979-82 monetary policy experiment was just the opposite. The Federal Peserve
began its move toward a degree of ease not warranted by the money growth targets
shortly after midyear 1982, and on October 9 the chairman publicly announced the
"temporary"abandonment of the Mltarget. The Baa bond yielddeclined from
16.78% in 1982:2 to 16,25% in 1982:3, as market participants began to infer that
policyhad changed, and the further decline to 14.39% in 1983:4 constituted the
largest one—guarter rally in the post—war experience of the U.S. fixed—income
seucirities market. The decline continued further, to 13.25% in 1983:2, as
money growth became still faster.
Participants in the U.S. securities markets are apparently more sensible
than to hold monetary policy prisoner to a counterproductive policy structure.
When the Federal Reserve abandons a policy that is not working, the market
recordsits approval,Footnotes
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1. Neither Ml growth nor M3 growth showed much slowing in1978.
2. The equation is
=.0895Ax +.0542Al +.8700 AP
(34)tl
(3.9) (25.2)
SE =.00347 =.88 p =—.1
where P is the GNP deflator, X is real GNP, I is the dollar priceof
imports, and all variables are in natural logarithms.
3. A crucial question, of course —hereand below—iswhether households
andfirms believed that monetary policy would take the course itdid
1979-82.perhaps the best that can be said is that, iftheexperiment of
these years was not an example of the kind of "regime changet' towhich new
classical macroeconomics arguments are supposed to be relevantthen itis
not clear to what real—world event they ever would be relevant. Sargent
and Wallace (1981) have made a potentially important qualificationto the
usual result as stated above, noting the necessity of a consistent
accompanyingfiscal policy; but the federal government's budget on ahigh-
employmentbasis showed only small deficits in 1980 and 1982, and a surplus
in 1981.
4. The equation is
r =.0472+.1441r —.0579 r +.1376 (L—S) +.9100r
Lt(1.4) (1.1)
St(-0.5) (2.3) (37.0)L,t—1
SE =.020 =.98 p =.4where rL is the Baa bond rate, r5 is the 3-month Treasury bill rate,
L and S are the respective amounts of long- and short-maturity federal
government debt outstanding, and all variables are in natural logarithms.
The coefficients on current and lagged r8 are highly significant jointly,
though not individually.
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